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Work sharing refers to work-time arrangements in which all mem-
bers of a work group reduce their hours of work to prevent the layoff of
some members of the group.  The reduction in working time and the
associated reduction in income are thus redistributed over the entire
work unit, rather than being concentrated on a few workers.  In Canada
this arrangement is formalized as the work sharing program under the
authority of the Unemployment Insurance Act.  Canadian work sharing
was introduced as a pilot program in 1977 and was modeled on similar
programs in effect in Europe.  In 1981, in response to growing numbers
of layoffs, the program was fully implemented and has been available
since that time.
The work sharing program is based on the premise that it is better
to keep workers employed than to have them experience a period of
unemployment.  Thus, its main objective is to maintain local, regional,
and industrial employment levels during periods of short-term adverse
economic conditions.  Work sharing also has secondary objectives for
both firms and employees.  For firms, the program aims to assist them
in retaining intact their skilled workforces and to help them avoid the
costs associated with temporary layoffs such as recruiting and training
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new employees.  For employees, the program aims to improve the level
of income for workers who would otherwise be laid off and to assist
workers in maintaining their skill levels and work motivation and
reducing dislocation and uncertainty.
Under a work sharing agreement, layoffs are averted or postponed
by reducing the workweek of employees in the designated core work
group.  An employer who intended to lay off 20 percent of employees
for three months may use work sharing to reduce working hours of all
employees by 20 percent over the same three-month period.  Lost
wages due to reductions of regular working hours are partially com-
pensated by unemployment insurance (UI) benefits.  Approximately 60
percent of lost wages are covered by UI benefits, charged to the UI
Account.  A UI-approved work sharing agreement is made between
three parties: management, a majority of the affected workers, and
Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC).  Workers who apply
for UI under work sharing do not have to serve the usual two-week
waiting period for benefits.  Employers must maintain fringe benefits
for the duration of the work sharing agreement.  Work sharing agree-
ments may last for 26 weeks and may be extended to 38 weeks under
special circumstances.  A major evaluation of the program was com-
pleted in 1993, covering the years 1989 and 1990.  The evaluation
examined a sample of firms that used work sharing.  Comparison firms
were pre-screened and included in the sample if they had seriously
considered laying off at least 20 percent of the members of one of their
business units due to adverse economic circumstances. This procedure
identified a sample of comparison firms who met the work sharing eli-
gibility criteria but did not participate in work sharing.
The evaluation found that work sharing clearly avoids layoffs.
However, in some cases layoffs may have been avoided without the
work sharing program.  Analysis of comparison firms showed that 7
percent of these firms did not lay off any employees.  Further, in 29
percent of the work sharing cases, layoffs which should have been
avoided by the program were merely postponed by the program, as
these employees were laid off in the six months following program par-
ticipation.  Of these layoffs, 75 percent were of a permanent nature.
Thus, in total, 64 percent of the layoffs that should have been averted
by participation in work sharing can be said to have been avoided as a
result of the program.  Comparison with the 1984 evaluation of the
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same program found that the program was somewhat less successful in
avoiding layoffs in 1989–1990 than it was in 1983.  
The evaluation also found significant benefits of work sharing par-
ticipation for workers.  Participants who would have most likely suf-
fered a layoff did much better than their comparison group counter-
parts who were laid off, experiencing a 19 percent reduction in income
versus a 47 percent reduction of the layoff group.  The work sharing
group displayed much higher levels of morale, better attitudes to work
and management, better social relations, and better physical and psy-
chological health vis à vis those in the layoff situation.
Firms also experienced benefits from work sharing participation.
They maintained the work sharing unit intact and expended $800–
$1,800 less per layoff equivalent than comparison employers.  They
also returned to full production sooner than firms that laid off employ-
ees.  However, there was no longer-term profitability or productivity
advantage for these firms.  This may suggest that work sharing is an
appropriate tool to help firms deal with cyclical fluctuations in demand,
but not for those firms facing fundamental, structural changes.  
Work sharing was found to be more expensive for the UI fund than
the layoff alternative.  Costs were 33 percent higher for work sharing
due to three factors: the waiver of the two-week UI waiting period for
work sharers, the fact that 30 percent of layoffs never collected UI, and
the incidence of layoffs in the post–work sharing period.1  However, to
balance these additional costs, there were also significant social bene-
fits.  The evaluation estimated that work sharing helped avoid costs
related to the stress of unemployment, avoidance of costs related to
unemployment scarring, and financial benefits to participating firms.
Overall, the evaluation estimates a benefit-to-cost ratio of about 2.6:1.  
While the 1993 evaluation answered many of the questions about
the program, it did not examine the relationship between the potential
demand for work sharing and economic conditions.  For example, if
the unemployment rates in the late 1980s were higher than the histori-
cal rates, what would have happened to the demand for UI-subsidized
work sharing?  What would have been the associated cost?  Could the
UI fund of the late 1980s have absorbed the additional cost?
This chapter concludes that the demand for work sharing is indeed
sensitive to changes in economic activities.  If the total unemployment
rates were 1.37–1.50 percentage points higher in 1988–1990, then the
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demand for work sharing participation would have been 9 percentage
points higher than it actually was in 1990.  The estimated cost for the
additional demand is $13.7 million.  In relative terms, the worsening of
economic conditions would have increased work sharing’s share of
total UI program expenditure in 1990 from 0.43 percent (actual) to
0.53 percent.  Obviously, within a reasonable range of demand shocks,
any increased demand for work sharing would have been too small to
create a serious financing problem for the UI account.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF PARTICIPATION IN THE 
WORK SHARING PROGRAM
From our recent survey of the existing literature on work sharing,
we have learned that the theoretical development in this field is prima-
rily concerned with work sharing’s effectiveness as a policy measure
for alleviating the unemployment problem during recession.2  In most
of the theoretical discussions, the demand for work sharing has been
taken as an inevitable phenomenon: during an economic downturn,
some firms prefer to use work sharing to layoffs as an adjustment
mechanism.  Thus, other than relating demand for work sharing to
business fluctuation, the existing literature is not very helpful in pro-
viding theoretical guidelines for specifying the demand for work shar-
ing equation.  In Canada, this problem is further complicated by the
lack of useful time series for a comprehensive empirical investigation
on this topic.  Although the administrative files contain some aggregate
time series on the number of work sharing applications approved, num-
ber of individuals in the program, and program expenditures, they have
hardly any information on the behavior and characteristics of work
sharing participating and nonparticipating firms.  Thus, the idea of
deriving a demand for work sharing equation from existing theories
and estimating it directly from available data do not presently seem to
be a feasible approach. 
Recognizing the problems mentioned above, the quantitative work
of this study circumvents the difficulty by working mainly with the
cross-sectional data collected for Employment and Immigration Can-
ada’s 1993 evaluation.3  Because these data have certain limitations, a
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specific methodology has to be developed to deal with them.  The
quantitative work includes four related components:
1) estimating a logistic equation that describes a firm’s probability
of participating in the work sharing program,    
2) creating a relatively depressed scenario for the late 1980s (1987–
1990) from a full-system econometric model simulation,
3) calculating the number of firms that would have become work
sharing participants in the more depressed scenario, and
4) calculating the cost of the additional demand and its impact on
the UI account.
The Logistic (Program Participation) Equation as a 
Demand Function
This study uses a logistic equation to estimate the probability of a
typical firm that would participate in the work sharing program in 1990.
The microdata are primarily from a special survey that Employment
and Immigration Canada (EIC) used to conduct its 1993 evaluation on
the work sharing program.  The data consist of 310 participating and
256 nonparticipating firms in 1990.4  The participating employer sample
was selected from an administrative file that contained the names of
work sharing firms during 1990.  Members of the comparison group
sample were selected from the EIC Record of Employment file; these
firms were selected on the basis of their comparability to work sharing
firms in characteristics and activity experience5 (e.g., members of the
comparison group must have laid off workers in 1990).  In carrying out
the econometric estimation, the procedure requires full information (no
missing data points) for the dependent and independent variables.
Because of missing values for selected variables, 43 firms have to be
excluded from the sample.  Thus, the final econometric estimation is
based on the information from 289 participating firms and 234 mem-
bers of the group of comparable employers.
Ideally output or sales data for periods immediately prior to the
firm’s applying for work sharing participation (program participants)
or laying off workers (members of the comparison group) should be
used as a measure of the firm’s business fluctuation.  Unfortunately, the
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survey was not designed to deal with the demand issue and did not col-
lect any output or sales data.  This forces us to search for a suitable
proxy.  The proxy used is the unemployment rate of the UI region
where the firm is located.  This variable is chosen for two reasons.
First, even though the UI regional unemployment rate, by definition,
cannot claim to be a unique economic activity indicator of the firm, it is
specific to the economic climate where the firm operates.  Second, the
time series for this variable is available. The data are from Statistics
Canada’s Labour Force Survey unpublished worksheets.  We have the
UI region data on labor force, employment, unemployment, and unem-
ployment rate dating back to 1979.  The availability of these time series
is operationally very important because it allows us to introduce a
dynamic element into the specification of the equation specification
(see the discussion below).
Even if one accepts the UI regional unemployment rate as a rea-
sonable proxy for approximating economic downturns, proper timing
and functional form remain crucial to the specification of the probabil-
ity of program participation equation.  First, using the regional unem-
ployment rate of 1990 as an explanatory variable would present a
serious technical problem.  In 1990, the participating firms were
already in the work sharing program.  If the program was effective in
lowering unemployment, then the UI regional unemployment rate of
1990 would also be dependent upon the extent of program participation
within the UI region.  This simultaneity bias presents an interpretation
problem because the estimated equation would have mixed the pro-
gram’s effects on regional unemployment with the influence of eco-
nomic activities on the demand for work sharing.   Second, if a firm
uses UI-subsidized work sharing as an adjustment mechanism for the
decline in the demand for its products, then the proxy variable should
probably be in the first difference form rather than level form.  This line
of reasoning suggests that the proper variable for explaining a firm’s
probability for program participation should be the change in the
unemployment experience of the UI region prior to the firm’s decision
to join (or not to join) the work sharing program.6  This specification
would not have been operational if the time series for the UI regional
unemployment rate is not available.  Symbolically, the specification for
the program participation equation may be summarized as follows: the
probability of firm i participating in the work sharing program is
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    Probabilityi = f(ΔURATEi,t – 1, Xi,t).
ΔURATEi,t – 1 = URATEi,t – 1 – URATEi,t – 2, URATEi denotes the unem-
ployment rate of the UI region where firm i is located, t refers to the
current period, and t – 1 the period prior to participating in the work
sharing program. Xi represents a vector of firm specific attributes,
including the average skill rating of the firm’s employees, percentage
of employees unionized, organization structure (whether the firm oper-
ated at one single location, multiple locations in one province, multiple
locations across Canada, or multiple locations internationally), the
firm’s industrial affiliation, the firm’s years of operation, etc. 
The logistic equation, when estimated, serves certain purposes.
First, it tests the hypothesis that the demand for work sharing depends
on changes in economic activities.  If the estimated coefficient for the
ΔURATEi, t – 1 variable is positive and statistically significant, it would
confirm that more firms would like to become program participants as
the economic climate worsens.  Second, it provides the reader with
some information on which other exogenous forces influence a firm’s
program participation decision.  Third, the estimated equation provides
us a means of calculating a firm’s probability of participating in the
work sharing program under various unemployment conditions.  This
last function is crucial to the theme of this study and will later become
apparent.  The estimated coefficients and essential statistics are shown
in Table 1.
In addition to the explanatory variables listed above, earlier ver-
sions of the estimated equation also included type of organizations
(private sector, public or nonprofit organizations), number of full-time
workers employed by the firm, and provincial dummies on the right-
hand side of the equation.  They were subsequently dropped for various
reasons.  The effects of provincial differences were conceptually and
empirically reflected in the recent changes in the UI region unemploy-
ment rate variable.7  Therefore, it was not necessary to include provin-
cial dummies as additional explanatory variables.  The other variables
were excluded because they were statistically insignificant and their
exclusion did not noticeably affect the estimated coefficients of the
other explanatory variables.
Although our main interest is in the “recent changes in the UI
region unemployment rate” variable, the estimated coefficients of other
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Table 1 Estimated Logistic Equation
Dependent variable: employer program participation (1=Yes, 0=No)
Number of firms included in the analysis: 523
–2Log likelihood 651.791
Goodness of fit 525.196
X2 df Significance
Model X2 67.446 12 0.0000




Employee’s average skill rating 0.2122 0.0710 8.9247 0.0028
Recent change in the UI region 
unemployment rate
0.2777 0.1370 4.1089 0.0427
Organization operations
Single location 0.2517 0.2907 0.7499 0.3865
Multiple (across Canada) 0.0630 0.4005 0.0247 0.8750
    Multiple (international) –1.1829 0.5089 5.4041 0.0201
    Multiple (one province) 0.0000
Type of industry
Primary –0.9615 0.5581 2.9682 0.0849
    Heavy manufacturing 0.1080 0.2558 0.1784 0.6728
    Construction –1.3049 0.3497 13.9260 0.0002
    Trade 0.4674 0.2830 2.7285 0.0986
     Other 0.4110 0.3381 1.4778 0.2241
     Light manufacturing 0.0000
Percentage of employees 
unionized
–0.0036 0.0019 3.5111 0.0610
Years of operation 0.0079 0.0046 2.9362 0.0866
Constant –0.9074 0.4469 4.1226 0.0423
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explanatory variables are also of some relevance.  Since the estimated
coefficients of the logistic equation cannot directly tell us the effects of
the explanatory variables on a firm’s probability of program participa-
tion, as an illustrative example we have calculated the possible impact
of each explanatory variable on participation probability by holding all
other explanatory variables constant at specific values.  Appendix A
reports the results.
“Employee’s average skill rating” significantly influences a firm’s
probability of using the work sharing program.8  All other things being
equal, a firm with many highly skilled workers tends to use the UI-sub-
sidized work sharing as the demand adjustment mechanism more often
than firms that employ a relatively large number of unskilled workers.
This is consistent with the notion that the option of work sharing par-
ticipation rests mostly with employers.  It is the cost-minimization con-
ditions that determine this behavior: Laid-off workers of relatively high
skills are more likely not available for subsequent rehiring when the
firm’s business starts to pick up; training new workers to fill these posi-
tions would be a relatively costly option to the firm.
The age of a firm’s establishment (in terms of their years of opera-
tion) also seems to have a positive influence on the firm’s program par-
ticipation decision, but this result is not statistically persuasive.  (The
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level
but not at the 5 percent level.)  How long the firm has been in business
should not greatly affect its present profit-maximization (or cost-mini-
mization) conditions.  Thus, the estimated coefficient of this variable is
meaningful only if it is an approximation of the firm’s outlook of future
business prospect.  In other words, a more established firm tends to be
more optimistic of its future than the relatively new companies.  There-
fore, it is more willing to use work sharing to maintain its labor force
during business slow-downs.  The unionization of workers exerts a
negative influence on the firm’s participation probability.  The statisti-
cal result, however, is not as strong as expected.  While most of the
local unions prefer work sharing to worker layoffs during economic
downturns, very few centralized unions endorse the work sharing
option because it erodes the seniority principle.  These two opposite
forces are probably sufficient to prevent this variable from becoming
statistically very strong.  The organization and industry dummies
present a mixed bag of results.  Some are highly significant and some
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are not significant at all.  As a principle, we keep all of them in the esti-
mated equation, even though dropping the insignificant dummies
would not have noticeably affected the rest of the estimated coeffi-
cients.
The estimated coefficient for the “recent change in the UI region
unemployment rate” variable is 0.2777 and is statistically significant at
the 4 percent level.  Although the estimated coefficient corresponds to
the dependent variable in a log (odds) form9 and therefore cannot
directly tell us the impact of this variable on the probability of program
participation, the positive coefficient confirms our a priori expectation.
Later in this section we will provide some impact estimates based on
the estimated equation and simulation techniques.
Different Economic Scenarios, 1987–1990
The logistic equation by itself is still not capable of answering the
questions posed in the introductory section of this paper.  For example,
the estimated logistic equation would show that if the expansion phase
of the business cycle of the 1980s ended earlier than it did, more firms
would probably have wanted to join the work sharing program.  This
does not give us a quantitative estimate of the size of the additional
demand that could have resulted from a more depressed economic cli-
mate in the late 1980s.  Apparently, one cannot obtain such a quantita-
tive estimate without specifying the deterioration of economic
activities in quantitative terms.  The simplest way to meet this informa-
tion requirement is to assume that the total unemployment rates in the
late 1980s were higher than their historical counterparts by certain per-
centage points.  These figures can then be distributed proportionally to
the UI regions to yield a set of hypothetical UI regional unemployment
rates, which can in turn be fed into the logistic equation for further
investigation.  In this study, we prefer a more plausible hypothetical
scenario than the arbitrarily assumed one.  The hypothetical (more
depressed) scenario used in this study is from the solution of a full-sys-
tem econometric model,10 in which Canadian exports, including auto-
mobiles and parts but excluding other manufactured goods and mining
products,11 in 1987–1990 were assumed to be 10 percent less than they
actually were historically (see Figure 1).  In this hypothetical setting,
because of the decline in aggregate demand resulting from the assumed
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drop in exports, more individuals were expected to become unem-
ployed.  The additional unemployed individuals can then be distributed
to the UI regions according to their labor force shares.  From these new
unemployment figures we may calculate the UI regional unemploy-
ment rates for the hypothetical scenario. 
The end result is that, in the hypothetical scenario, more individu-
als would have been unemployed and the impacts on the total unem-
ployment rates were noticeable (0.70, 1.37, 1.49, and 1.50 percentage
points higher than the historical figures in 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990,
respectively).  The unemployment rates for the actual and hypothetical
scenarios are graphically presented in Figure 2.12  Furthermore, we
have distributed the additional unemployed individuals (not shown
here but available in the solutions of the model simulations) of the
hypothetical scenario across 49 UI regions, according to the labor
shares of the UI regions, and recalculated the UI regional unemploy-
ment rates for the more depressed (hypothetical) scenario.
Although this macrosimulation is not essential to the quantitative
work of this study, we have decided to use it.  The model solution gen-
erates a reasonably realistic but more depressed economy than the
Figure 1 Canadian Exports, 1987–1990
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actual experience of 1987–1990.  It also illustrates that exogenous
forces could have easily ended the expansion phase of the 1980s busi-
ness cycle much earlier than it did.
Expected Number of Participating Firms under 
Different Economic Scenarios 
The estimated logistic equation, the actual UI regional unemploy-
ment rates, and the UI regional unemployment rates for the hypotheti-
cal scenario provide us with the required tools and information for
calculating the probability of program participation for each firm for
two scenarios (base-case and the hypothetical).  First, for the base-case,
we obtain a set of probability estimates for all firms (including partici-
pants and members of the comparison group) by inserting the actual
values of all explanatory variables into the unscrambled logistic equa-
tion.13  Similarly, for the hypothetical scenario, by replacing the actual
UI regional unemployment rates with their hypothetical counterparts
while keeping the actual values of other explanatory variables
Figure 2 The Unemployment Rate, 1987–1990
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unchanged, we may calculate a set of estimates for the firms’ chances
of participating in the work sharing program under the more depressed
economic climate. The first set of estimated figures shows each firm’s
probability of participation, with the values of all explanatory variables
identical to their actual (historical) values.  This may be labelled as the
base-case probability.  The second set is similar to the first, except that
the calculation replaces the actual UI regional unemployment rates
with the hypothetical scenario’s UI regional unemployment rates.  In
other words, the second set shows each firm’s probability of participa-
tion under the more depressed economic conditions of the hypothetical
scenario, while holding all other things constant.
The estimated probability provides us with the information con-
cerning a firm’s chance of becoming a program participant, but it still
does not tell us whether or not the firm would indeed be in the pro-
gram.  After all, even a firm with a probability of 90 percent participa-
tion still has a slim chance of not being a participant.  In this study we
use the random-draw simulation technique to determine whether a firm
is in or out of the work sharing program.  The procedure is identical to
drawing a “chip” randomly from a hat.  For example, the participation
probability for a certain firm was usually 70 percent (the base-case),
but under the more depressed economic climate of the hypothetical
scenario its probability increased to 71 percent in 1990.  To determine
whether or not this firm would become a program participant in the
base-case and in the hypothetical scenario, we create two separate hats.
The first hat would have 70 chips marked “in” and 30 marked “out,”
while the second hat would have 71 chips marked “in” and 29 chips
marked “out” to reflect its slightly higher probability of program par-
ticipation.  We would then randomly draw one chip from each of the
hats and record the results of the random draws.   Repeat the same pro-
cedures for all firms in the sample. The difference between the total
numbers of “in” firms in the two scenarios (base-case and hypothetical)
would be taken as the estimated impacts of the more depressed eco-
nomic climate on the demand for work sharing.  This is, however, only
the result of one random-draw experiment.  The results in Table 2 are
the averages of 10 experiments.14
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Table 2 Results of Random-Draw Simulations (based on a sample 
of 523 firms)
The simulated figure for the base-case underestimates the actual
number of participants in 1990 by 12 firms (an error of 4 percent).
Since the estimated logistic equation cannot be expected to predict the
probability of participation perfectly and the random-draw experiments
have been conducted only 10 times, the goodness of fit appears to be
acceptably close.
The simulation results suggest that under the influence of a worse
economic climate, as specified by the hypothetical scenario, the
demand for work sharing participation would have been 9 percentage
points higher than it was in 1990.  Since the results reported are based
on a sample of 289 participating and 234 nonparticipating firms, we
have to mark up the total number of participating firms (work sharing
applications approved) in 1990 by 9 percent to yield an estimate of par-
ticipating firms for the total economy; that is,
hypothetical scenario: number of participating firms, total 
economy, 1990 = 6,297 × (1 + 0.09) = 6,873,
where 6,297 is the actual total number of work sharing applications
approved in 1990.  In other words, the more depressed economic cli-
mate of the hypothetical scenario would have induced 576 more firms
to participate in the work sharing program in 1990.  This estimate
should, however, be taken as an illustrative example rather than a defin-
itive answer.  First, aside from the imperfection of the econometric and
simulation techniques, the analysis is based on a relatively small sam-
ple size and the data were not originally collected to test the sensitivity
of work sharing demand to economic activity fluctuation.  In the future,
evaluators should probably take the demand dimension as an integral
part of the evaluation framework and revisit this topic.  Second, the
estimate depends directly on the degree of activity slowdowns created
by the macromodel simulation.  The deterioration outlined in the hypo-
Total number of 
participating firms 
(base-case)
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thetical economy is only one of the many plausible scenarios.  A differ-
ent hypothetical scenario would, of course, yield different results.
ASSOCIATED COSTS, IMPACTS ON THE UI ACCOUNT,
AND IMPLICATIONS
There are at least three remaining questions that we should attempt
to answer: 1) What is the cost of the additional demand for work shar-
ing?  2) What is its impact on the UI Account?  3) How would the gov-
ernment have reacted to the additional applications for the work
sharing program?
Costs and Impacts on the UI Account
From the administrative data, we know that a participating firm in
1990 cost the government an average of $9,798.15  However, this would
be, a priori, a downward biased estimate for calculating the associated
costs for our purposes.  It fails to account for the additional utilization
of work sharing among firms already in the work sharing program
when unemployment increases.  The available data do not allow us to
calculate this downward bias accurately.  In this study, we use the 1990
administrative data to approximate the relationship between UI
regional work sharing expenditure and the UI regional unemployment
rate (weighted by the region’s employment share).  The estimated
equation suggests that the average cost for a participating firm would
have been about 11.9 percent higher than the actual average cost in the
hypothetical scenario.16  Based on this information, we may approxi-
mate the cost of the additional demand for program participation in the
hypothetical scenario as follows:
(i)  Estimated cost of additional demand = increased cost for firms
already in the work sharing program in 1990 + cost for financing
576 additional participating firms resulting from the worsening of
economic conditions in the hypothetical scenario
($9,798 × 0.119 × 6,297) + ($9,798 × 1.119 × 576) 
= $13.66 million.
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(ii)  Actual work sharing program expenditure in 1990 = $61.7 mil-
lion.
(iii) Total UI expenditure in 1990 = $14,355 million.
Ratio A = 100 × (i)/(iii) = 0.095%.
Ratio B = 100 × (ii)/(iii) = 0.429%
Ratio C = 100 × [(i)+(ii)]/(iii) = 0.525%.
In 1990, the total Unemployment Insurance Developmental Uses
(UIDU) were substantially below the maximum of 15 percent allowed
by law (Bill C-21).  Work sharing expenditure in this year accounted
for less than 18 percent of the total UIDU expenditure.  These statis-
tics, along with the fact that work sharing was a relatively small pro-
gram option,17 suggest that the government could have easily absorbed
the additional demand for work sharing of the hypothetical scenario by
a minor reallocation of UI funds while keeping the total UI program
expenditure of 1990 unchanged.
Government’s Response to the Demand for Work Sharing
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the unemployment rate
and work sharing applications approved.  The correlation between
them is positive but statistically insignificant.  (The simple correlation
coefficient for the variables equals 0.53, which is not even statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.18)  Figure 4 presents the graph for the
change in the unemployment rate19 and work sharing applications
approved.  It becomes obvious that the two variables are closely corre-
lated with each other.  The simple correlation coefficient is 0.90, which
is statistically highly significant.  As contended earlier, firms’ demand
for work sharing is related to the change in economic activities rather
than the level of activities.  In this examination of the aggregate time
series, we have found other indirect, circumstantial evidence to support
this contention.
If the “work sharing applications approved” series is interpreted as
the locus of the equilibrium points between the demand for and supply
of work sharing with the government adopting a 100 percent accom-
modative policy,20 then the data should reflect the demand and supply
information equally well.  The existing data seem to suggest that gov-
ernment’s policy has been quite “accommodative.”  In 1982–1983, the
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Figure 3 The Unemployment Rate and Work Sharing 
Applications Approved
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average change in the unemployment rate was 2.18 percent; the aver-
age number of applications approved was 8,009 per annum.  From
1984 through 1989, a period of uninterrupted economic expansion, the
average change in the unemployment rate was –0.733 percent, and the
annual average of applications approved declined to 2,573 firms.  In
1990–1991, the change in the unemployment rate became positive
again (the average change was 1.42 percent), and the number of work
sharing applications climbed to 8,613 per annum.  This sensitivity to
changes in the unemployment rate suggests that had the economic cli-
mate in the late 1980s become worse than it actually was, the govern-
ment could have probably absorbed the additional demand. 
 Reid and Meltz (1983) and Pal (1983) note that the Canadian gov-
ernment’s interest in work sharing has risen and fallen with changes in
the unemployment rate.  They argue that instead of implementing pol-
icy on the basis of careful long-run planning, the use of the program as
an ad hoc response to the crisis of rising unemployment obviously
leaves a lot to be desired.  Their observation on the sensitivity of work
sharing applications approved to changes in the unemployment rate has
been quite accurate.  In recent years, the sensitivity seems even higher.
However, their criticism of the government’s accommodative approach
may have been too harsh.  One would expect that the work sharing pro-
gram, especially work sharing as a passive policy measure,21 should
always be responsive to the demand of firms.  Whether or not the pro-
gram could have played a more active role in the Canadian labor mar-
ket is a moot question.  Not only has France’s experience of using work
sharing as an active policy (job creation) not been convincingly suc-
cessful, the relatively small size of the Canadian work sharing program
does not suggest that it has the potential of creating a large number of
jobs.  Given the existing fiscal stance of the government, expanding the
program for the sake of testing out the effectiveness of work sharing as
a job creation policy must be rated as one of the most unlikely events in
the foreseeable future.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In the last decade in North America, corporate restructuring has
imposed some alternatives to conventional working time arrangements.
The increased use of nonstandard forms of work, including part-time,
contract, and outsourcing, is associated with such restructuring in the
context of competitive cost reduction.  At the same time, the Canadian
unemployment rate increased dramatically to a 9.5 percent average in
the 1980s and the 1990s.
Policy responses to the growth of nonstandard work are now just
emerging, starting with the changes in the Canadian employment insur-
ance scheme to make eligibility for benefits based on hours, not weeks.
An hours-based system better reflects current work patterns, particu-
larly the rise in part-time and multiple job hours.
The other major insurance policy response is the work sharing pro-
gram, which, in its current design, is clearly a countercyclical measure
to enable firms to hoard labor or for workers to share unemployment
during downturns.  In its design, the program is not available to subsi-
dize corporate restructuring.  Two formal evaluations of this program
have shown that work sharing does make a difference in averting lay-
offs, and, despite being more expensive to the UI account than straight
layoff benefits, the economic and social benefits accruing to participat-
ing firms and workers more than offset the program costs.  This chapter
extends the evaluation work by looking specifically at the relationship
between changes in economic activities and the demand for work shar-
ing.
To examine this relationship, this study uses microsimulation as
well as macrosimulation techniques.  In a full-system macrosimulation,
a 10 percent reduction of Canadian exports of nonmanufacturing/non-
mining products and exports of automobiles and auto parts in 1987–
1990 would result in a 1.5 percentage point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate by 1990.  This change in declining economic activity would
increase work sharing participation by 9 percent, at a cost of an addi-
tional $13.66 million in 1990 to a $14.35 billion UI account for that
year.  Within the existing legislative and regulatory framework, such an
increased demand of work sharing could easily have been absorbed.
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The 1993 evaluation results suggest that the additional expenditures
could have been cost-effective as well.
This finding, of course, is relevant to the program as it currently
operates.  It sheds little light on how work sharing might be extended
under current rules or how it might be used in an aggressive redesign of
working time or under different rules for active job creation purposes.
Suggestions have been made by both policymakers and academics that
work sharing agreements might reduce UI premiums to firms that cre-
ate and finance new jobs to compensate for the reduction in working
time of designated employees.  Under these circumstances, work shar-
ing may create job opportunities for youth and other unemployed
groups back-filling designated positions.  This chapter does not address
this policy debate directly.  What it shows clearly is that work sharing
is sensitive to the change rather than the level of economic activity, and
that the probability of work sharing participation is higher among firms
with higher-level skilled workforces.   
Job creation stimulation is more common at the entry skills level.
This suggests that the present program is limited in its potential as a
job creation initiative.  Even if work sharing is a good investment, as
the evaluation results show, the cost of providing it to all potential lay-
off situations may be prohibitive.  This chapter shows that an increased
demand for work sharing can be accommodated as a relatively small
program option under UIDU.  In the current fiscal environment, it is
difficult to imagine a proactive use of work sharing as a job creation
mechanism without finding new monies or at least reprofiling UIDU
expenditures at the expense of the other two major UIDU activities:
UI-sponsored training and job creation partnerships.  Finally, this chap-
ter raises some questions about the appropriateness of work sharing as
a job creation stimulus directed at firms that are primarily interested in
maintaining a skilled workforce.  Policymakers would need to take this
present feature of work sharing participation into consideration if they
were to redesign work sharing as both a job maintenance and job cre-
ation program.  Before embarking upon this, however, it would be
instructive to study more closely the work sharing experience in France
in the 1980s and the reasons why the program reverted back from a job
creation initiative to an employment maintenance scheme.
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  Notes
We are grateful to Garnett Picot of Statistics Canada and Wayne Vroman of Urban
Institute for their comments on various aspects of the work contained here.  All errors
and omissions remain, of course, our responsibility.
1. The 1993 evaluation study might have overlooked two other factors that could
have contributed to the comparatively high cost of the work sharing program.
First, relative to the layoff option, work sharing tended to include a higher share
of senior workers.  Since earnings and seniority are positively correlated, the aver-
age work sharing benefit would be higher than the average regular UI benefit.
Second, work sharing would be more expensive than regular UI payments if the
layoff conversion ratio was less than unity, i.e., the increase in work sharing
weeks exceeded the decrease in layoff weeks.
2. See, for example, MaCoy and Morand (1984), and Owen (1989).
3. See Employment and Immigration Canada (1993).
4. The survey also contains information for the year 1989.  Because of the time con-
straint, we have decided not to duplicate the empirical work for 1989.  In the early
stages of an economic downturn, firms are not sure whether dismissals and long-
term layoffs are necessary; their demand for work sharing may be different from
those at different points of the business cycle.  Future work on this topic should
probably investigate the sensitivity of work sharing demand at different points of
the business cycle as well.
5. For a detailed description of survey design and characteristics of participating
firms and members of the comparison group, see Employment and Immigration
Canada (1993).
6. Empirically, when the level of regional unemployment rate enters the right-hand
side of the equation, the coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant.  On
the other hand, the first difference of the regional unemployment rate is statisti-
cally significant, and the result seems quite robust.  The inclusion or exclusion of
other explanatory variables in the specification does not significantly alter the
result.
7. This variable is defined as (URATEi,1989 – URATEi,1988); URATEi denotes the
unemployment rate of the UI region where firm i is located, and the second sub-
script refers to a specific year.  When the variable is expressed in terms of relative
change, [i.e., (URATEi,1989 – URATEi,1988)/URATEi,1988], the estimated coeffi-
cient remains positive but the statistical result is substantially weakened.  It is sta-
tistically different from zero only at the 12.6 percent level.  The statistical results
for the other estimated coefficients remain basically the same.  This finding sug-
gests that workers and employers take the absolute change in the unemployment
rate as a change in economic conditions, but they are probably unfamiliar with the
concept of the relative change in the unemployment rate.
8. In the survey, the employer was asked to rate the firm’s employees’ literary skills,
numeracy skills, and technological literacy separately, with a rating of 1 denoting
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extremely low in the category, 4 average, and 7 extremely high.  The variable used
in the logistic regression equation is the average of the three skill variables.
9. That is, ln [p/(1 – p)], where p denotes the probability of work sharing participa-
tion.
10. The econometric model consists of about 300 behavioral equations and identities.
It is a modified and extended version of the Conference Board’s PC–Canadian
Model (PCCDN).  See Conference Board of Canada (1989).
11. The exports of other manufacturing goods and mining products are endogenously
determined in the full-system econometric model.
12. The difference between the base-case and the hypothetical scenario represents the
impact of the assumption on total Canadian exports.  In this report, for the sake of
simplification and interpretation convenience, we add this difference to the actual
data of the variable in question.  This procedure allows us to compare the hypo-
thetical scenario figures directly to the historical data in level form.
13. The dependent variable for the estimated logistic equation is in the form of ln[p/(1
– p)], where p denotes the probability of program participation.  Feeding the val-
ues of the explanatory variables directly into the estimated equation would give us
the ln odds rather than the probability.
14. The random draw process is such that a participating firm may or may not be clas-
sified as “in” the work sharing program; similarly, a nonparticipant is not neces-
sarily out of the program in the experiment.  Since the final tabulation compares
the simulated figures of the two scenarios (base-case and hypothetical), this lack
of perfect fit should not present an interpretation problem.  The errors are random
and should be cancelled out in the process of calculating the differences. 
15. This figure, which is the ratio of the total work sharing expenditures in 1990, to
the number of applications approved in 1990, is only the short-run book value.  It
does not take into account the addition of UI benefits paid to work sharing work-
ers who were laid off in the post–work sharing period.  See Employment and
Immigration Canada (1993).
16. The estimated equation:
Work Sharing Expenditurei = 180.95 + 4170.22 × URatei × ESharei,
       (0.76)       (5.31)
         adjusted R2 = 0.37,
where a) figures in parentheses are t-statistics; b) i: UI region i; URatei: the unem-
ployment rate of UI region i; Esharei: the employment share of UI region i (i.e.,
employment of UI region i/total employment).
17. Why did so few employers use the work sharing program as a means for adjusting
workers hours?  The answer to this question is not obvious, and is a research topic
itself.  Work sharing has always been a relatively small program in Canada.  From
1982–1995, the total unemployment rate fluctuated between 6.2 and 10.7 percent,
the ratio of “work sharing weeks paid to total UI benefits weeks paid” remained in
the “0.3 to 2.9 percent” neighborhood. 
18. We have only 10 observations for this calculation.
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19. That is, the first difference of the unemployment rate, URATEt – URATEt – 1.
20. This assumes that the government usually approves all legitimate applications for
work sharing participation.
21. For a discussion on active and passive work sharing, see Tremblay (1989).
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Table A1 Estimated Effects of Explanatory Variables on Program 
Participation Probabilitya
Variable Probability
Employee’s average skill rating 0.052
Recent change in the UI region unemployment rate 0.068
Organization operations
    Single location 0.000
    Multiple (across Canada) 0.000
    Multiple (international) -0.272
    Multiple (one province) –  reference case 0.000
Type of industry
    Primary –0.228
    Heavy manufacturing 0.000
    Construction –0.295
    Trade 0.113
     Other 0.000
     Light manufacturing   –  reference case 0.000
Percentage of employees unionized –0.001
Years of operation 0.002
a Each value denotes the marginal effect of one additional unit of the variable on a typ-
ical firm’s program participation probability, evaluating at the mean of the variable
and holding all other explanatory variables constant at their mean values.  If the vari-
able is a 0 or 1 dummy variable, then 0 is taken as the mean in the calculation.  “Orga-
nization” and “industry” variables statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level are
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